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Psychiatric Defenses in Tax Fraud Cases
THOMAS J. GALLAGHER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax fraud is wrought with difficulties from the viewpoint of both
the taxpayer and the government.' Notwithstanding the fact that
"fraud" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, tax evasion
is trifurcated into the civil2 and criminals offenses listed in the
Code, and the crimes as codified in Title 18 of the United States
Code.4 In addition to the varying degrees of proof required under
the different offenses, merging shades of culpability must be estab-
lished for decisions favorable to the government. Furthermore, al-
most every successful criminal prosecution could result in a sus-
tained assessment of civil penalties in a separate proceeding. 5 How-
ever, if the taxpayer can successfully establish that he lacked the
* Research Associate in Taxation & Assistant in Instruction, Yale Law
School; A.B., Villanova University, 1971, J.D. (Magna Cum Laude), Loyola
University School of Law (New Orleans), 1974; LL.M., Yale Law School,
1975; J.S.D. (Candidate), Yale Law School; Member of the New Jersey Bar.
1. See, e.g., TAX FRAUD (G. Holmes & J. Cox eds. 1973).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6651, 6653, and various other sections. All
tax sections references are to the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 unless
noted otherwise [hereinafter cited as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954].
3. See, e.g., id. §§ 7201-06.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious or fraudulent claims), § 371 (con-
spiracy), § 1001 (false statements), § 1621 (perjury) (1972).
5. See Balter, Three New Cases Hold Criminal Tax Conviction
"Proves" Civil Fraud, 23 J. TAX. 158 (1966).
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requisite intent to evade his taxes, the fraud allegations must fail.6
By proving the absence of a willful intent due to mental incapacity,
several defendants have prevailed in their contentions that a psy-
chiatric defense to a tax fraud charge can exculpate them from both
civil and criminal penalties. 7 However, other cases in which psychi-
atric defenses have been asserted indicate that although the defense
is valid, it often fails for lack of proof.8 Little is known about psy-
chiatric defenses to tax fraud charges, and the courts have been
reluctant to consider the issues in those cases in which the defenses
have been raised.9 The purpose of this article is to examine the
defense and the questions presented by its assertion. After briefly
reviewing the substantive federal tax fraud offenses, and examining
the traditional psychiatric defenses in other settings, the tax fraud
cases in which the defense has been raised will be considered. The
interrelated policy considerations will be discussed, as will the con-
stitutional and procedural aspects of the defense in tax fraud cases.
In conclusion, suggestions will be made which will facilitate a re-
consideration of the present practices.
II. FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW
Although undefined in the Code, tax fraud refers to a willful
attempt to reduce or to eliminate tax liability by paying less tax
than that which is known to be due.10 Tax avoidance differs from
tax evasion in that the tax avoider attempts to diminish taxation
in a manner which he believes to be legal, while the tax evader
attempts to do so in a manner which he knows to be illegal. Thus
tax evasion charges always require proof of an intentional factual
6. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Emanuel Hollman, 38 T.C. 251 (1962).
8. Estate of Craddock, 27 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 805, 809 (1968); Clinton
H. Martin, 18 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 100 (1959), aff'd, 272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.
1959); J.E. Handy, 450 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846
(1972); Fred W. Staudt, 12 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1417 (1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d
610 (4th Cir. 1954); United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1961),
aff'd, 305 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1962).
9. See Ritholz & Fink, New Developments and Dangers in the Psychi-
atric Defense to Tax Fraud, 32 J. TAX 322 (1970); Ritholz, Intent and Psychi-
atric Disturbances in Tax Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 23R INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1339
(1965).
10. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943): "[T]he serious and
inclusive felony defined to consist of willful attempt in any manner to
evade or defeat the tax."
Imisrepresentation, while a tax avoidance charterization merely de-
notes an attempt to construe the facts so as to minimize tax liabil-
ity.11
The distinction between avoidance and evasion is critical as dif-
ferent consequences attach to each. An honest but unsuccessful
evasion scheme will subject the taxpayer to various civil fraud and
criminal evasion penalties. 12
Because the concept of criminal tax fraud in section 7201 of the
code is similar to the civil fraud concept in section 6653(b), it is
possible to impose civil penalties in every criminal evasion case.' 3
However, because civil fraud may be proved by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence,"'14 while criminal fraud must be proved "beyond rea-
sonable doubt,"' 5 criminal prosecutions are generally restricted to
the most flagrant cases.' 6
Although numerous sections of the Code provide for penal sanc-
tions, section 7201 is the provision most frequently used in criminal
tax indictments. The statute provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or de-
feat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall,
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a fel-
ony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution.' 7
This section has been construed to encompass a variety of situa-
tions including attempts to evade the taxes of another.'8 In addi-
tion to the statutory prerequisites of willfulness and an attempt
to evade or defeat a tax or the payment thereof, the statute requires
proof that a tax was due for the year involved. Evidence establish-
ing that the taxpayer substantially 19 understated his income or
11. See Beck, When Avoidance: When Evasion, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 1093 (1960); Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoid-
ances, 51 MIcH. L. Rav. 1021 (1953).
12. See supra notes 2-4.
13. See supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Estate of Craddock, 27 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 805 (1968).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601, 603 (E.D. Pa.
1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1962): "We were, and still are, convinced
by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on those dates this defend-
ant was not suffering from any disease of the mind. .. ."
16. Cf. Lipton, The Substantial Understatement Requirement in Crim-
inal Tax Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1175 (1961).
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
18. See Benhan v. United States, 215 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1954) (husband
and wife); United States v. Brill, 270 F.2d 525 (3rd Cir. 1959) (corporation
and director).
19. The "substantial" requirement is a judicial gloss. See Lipton, supra
note 16.
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overstated his expenditures so that a considerable tax was due and
owing, must be introduced; further, it must be shown that the tax-
payer knowingly falsified his return and willfully attempted to
evade or defeat his taxes.20 In Spies v. United States, the Supreme
Court described the nature of the attempt required to support a
tax evasion charge:
The attempt made criminal by this statute does not consist of con-
duct that would culminate in a more serious crime but for some
impossibility of completion or interruption or frustration. This is
an independent crime complete in its most serious form when the
attempt is complete and nothing is added to its criminality by suc-
cess or consummation, as would be the case, say, of attempting
murder. Although the attempt succeeds in evading tax ... the
prosecution can be only for attempt.2 1
The Court elaborated further, requiring an affirmative act of
wrongdoing as a prerequisite to liability for a criminal attempt.
The Court reasoned that:
By way of illustration . . . we think affirmative willful attempt
may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a double set of
books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or docu-
ments, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or
covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, any con-
duct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal. 22
This criterion is satisfied in a majority of prosecutions by the filing
of a false and fraudulent return, an affirmative act in itself.28
Thus, the mere fact of filing in these circumstances is sufficient
to support a conviction for evasion.
24
In addition to the felony provision of section 7201, section 7206(1)
makes it an offense for one to:
Willfully [make] and [subscribe] any return, statement or other
document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration
that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does
not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter
.25
20. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
21. Id. at 498-99.
22. Id.; United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
23. Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373 (1957).
24. In Imholte v. United States, 226 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1955), the
court stated: "The wilful attempt to evade or defeat any tax in any manner
is the offense defined. The offense may be committed in any manner so
long as there is a wilful attempt to evade the tax."
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7206(1). This section is referred to as the
"back-door" statute because there is no need to prove income.
This statute makes the falsification of a return a felony regardless
of the tax consequences of the falsification. It is useful primarily
where evasion itself may be difficult to prove because of the small
amount of tax avoided or where the exact amount evaded is diffi-
cult to ascertain. The only showing required under 7206(1) is that
the defendant willfully signed a document he knew to be false.26
Section 7206 (2) makes it a felony to:
Willfully aid or assist in, or procure, counsel, or advise the prepara-
tion or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising
under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim or
other document which is fraudulent or false as to any material mat-
ter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or
consent of the person authorized to present such return, affidavit,
claim, or document. 27
This section is designed to prevent the giving of advice in the prep-
aration of false returns.28 Since the acts constituting an attempt
to evade or defeat a tax under section 7201 may differ from those
comprising a violation of section 7206 (2), a defendant may be prose-
cuted under both sections without being placed in jeopardy twice
for the same offense.
Section 7203 is the most frequently used misdemeanor provision
of the Code. It provides that:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or
tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under author-
ity thereof to make a return (other than a return required under
authority of section 6105), keep such records, or supply such infor-
mation, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make
such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the
time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both, together with the costs
of prosecution. 29
This section facilitates the enforcement of the Code's administrative
provisions; prosecutions may be commenced for (1) failure to make
a return, (2) failure to pay any tax, (3) failure to keep records,
26. United States v. Ratner, 464 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1972).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7206 (2).
28. United States v. Kelley, 105 F.2d 912, 917 (2d Cir. 1939):[T]he statute . . . expressly provides that the assistance shall be
a crime 'whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge
or consent of the person authorized . . . to present such return.'
The purpose was very plainly to reach the advisors of taxpayers
who got up their returns, and who might wish to keep down the
taxes because of the credit they would get with their principals,
who might be altogether innocent.
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203.
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and (4) failure to supply information. In addition, liability under
this section does not depend on the existence of a tax liability for
the year in which the offense allegedly occurred.30 Because a sec-
tion 7203 violation is not a lesser included offense under section
7201,31 a person may be convicted under both sections as long as
each offense requires proof of a fact not essential to the establish-
ment of the other.3 2 Because it is not necessary to show a failure
to file a return to establish an attempt to evade, or to demonstrate
an affirmative act to prove a failure to file, a person may be prose-
cuted for both offenses without inviting double jeopardy problems.
There are numerous other civil and criminal code offenses for
which a taxpayer may be prosecuted.A
III. MENTAL STATE
In all criminal tax fraud prosecutions the government must prove
that the defendant acted willfully. Evidence that the defendant
acted voluntarily is insufficient to establish willfulness.3 4  In
United States v. Murdock,35 the Supreme Court defined a willful
act as:
an act done with a bad purpose ... without justifiable excuse . .
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely ... [w]ithout ground for be-
lieving it lawful ... or ... marked by careless disregard whether
one has the right to so act.3 6
In addition to reaffirming this definition, the Court in United States
v. Bishop37 held that: "[T] he word 'willfully' has the same mean-
ing in section 7207 that it has in section 7206 (1) ," and probably in
all criminal tax fraud statutes. The Court reasoned that an analy-
sis which expressly distinguishes the necessary elements of each
offense from the uniform requirement of willfulness would result
30. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
31. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1973); Berra v. United
States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
32. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
33. INT. REV. CVDE OF 1954, §§ 7207-15, 6651-59, 6671, 6672, 6674-89; see
Symposium on Tax Fraud, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 431.
34. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-98 (1943).
35. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
36. Id. at 394-95.
37. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
38. Id. at 361.
in greater clarityY' Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded by recogniz-
ing that:
The Court's consistent interpretation of the word "willfully" to re-
quire an element of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of
Congress to construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax vi-
olater from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of taxpay-
ers.
40
Because willfulness requires a specific intent, it "must be proved
by independent evidence and. . . cannot be inferred from the mere
understatement of income. '41 However, willfulness may be in-
ferred from the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's acts, since
direct proof of such willfulness is rarely found.42 But such facts
and circumstances must indicate the requisite degree of mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt. The "bad purpose" necessitated is diffi-
cult to establish due to its subjectivity. While both the tax avoider
and the tax evader intend to diminish tax liability, they are moti-
vated in different manners. 43 Thus, intention is the ultimate rea-
son for aiming at their immediate objective, and motive is the ul-
terior intent or the cause underlying their intent. Intention is the
object of their act; motive is the basis of the intent. In tax fraud
cases it is not the intention as evidenced by external conduct which
constitutes the essence of the offense, but rather the specific intent
accompanying the act or omission, or the cause underlying the in-
tent as evidenced by external conduct, which comprises the of-
fense.44 The willful element of tax fraud necessitates the inten-
tional and something more. The Supreme Court interpreted it to
include "an act done with a bad purpose .. .without justifiable
excuse." 45 If the motive underlying the externally evidenced inten-
tion to diminish tax liability is within the law, the taxpayer does
not become a criminal by an inadvertant failure to conform to the
standard of conduct prescribed in the Code. The necessity of the
defense of a reasonable mistake of fact, or even law, is obvious when
the complexities of tax law are considered. Randolph Paul recog-
nized this fact when he stated that "[A] rough and ready moral
sense of 'right' and 'wrong' is hardly adequate to guide the citizen
39. Id. at 360 n.8, "Greater clarity might well result from an analysis
that distinguishes the express elements, such as an 'attempt to evade,' pre-
scribed by section 7201, from the uniform requirement of willfulness."
40. Id. at 361.
41. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954).
42. See, e.g., Shinyo Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1954).
43. See Beck, When Avoidance: When Evasion, N.Y.U. 18T INST. ON
FED. TAx. 1093 (1960).
44. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973).
45. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).,
[VOL. 3: 252, 1976] Psychiatric Defenses
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
through the devious paths of the spawning tax jungle. '4 Conse-
quently, if it can be established that the taxpayer was motivated
by an attempt to perpetrate a lawful tax avoidance scheme no crim-
inal or fraudulent liability will attach as a result of his actions.
However, if he was motivated by a "bad purpose," sufficiently es-
tablished, liability will issue. This is because in the former case
the taxpayer lacked the required mens rea, and in the latter in-
stance the defendant possessed the culpability needed for a finding
of willfulness. Whenever the element of willful intent is absent,
the prosecution must fail because the essential element of intent
is abrogated. If the defendant can vitiate the "bad purpose" re-
quired by United States v. Murdock47 the indictment must be ter-
givesated.
In fact, in Leland v. Oregon,48 the Supreme Court approved a
charge allowing the jury to consider evidence of the defendant's
mental disability on the issue of intent, even though the defendant
was found legally sane by the jury. Despite the difficulty involved,
one commentator has asserted that:
The opportunity for full consideration of all the evidence, including
the psychiatric, and the full development of the whole truth offered
by the intent route must be fully developed in tax cases.49
In another context it was stated that:
[T]he paucity of judicial authority on . . . that defense . . . often
results in the vitiation of its potential success. The unequal appli-
cation of a criminal defense in situations where it could be raised
successfully seems to be a prohibition of substantive rights by an
uncertain and ersatz criminal procedure. 50
IV. TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE PSYCHIATRIC DEFENSE
Any consideration of the use of psychiatric evidence in tax eva-
sion cases must begin with an examination of the defense as it has
evolved in other contexts. In the M'Naghten Case,51 the defendant
46. R. 'PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 289 (1938).
47. 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
48. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
49. Ritholz, Intent and Psychiatric Disturbances in Tax Fraud Cases,
N.Y.U. 23RD INST. ON FED. TAX. 1339, 1360 (1965).
50. Gallagher, The Viability of Discriminatory Prosecution as a Defense
to a Criminal Case, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 318, 331 (1973).
51. 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
was acquitted of a murder charge because the jury found that he
was incompetent. In reviewing the case, the House of Lords deter-
mined that at the time the act was committed the defendant did
not have a sufficient ability to understand that what he was doing
was wrong. The Law Lords pointed out that although everyone
is considered to be sane and responsible for his acts, a successful
defense of insanity could clearly prove that, at the time of the com-
mission of the act, the defendant was laboring under such a defect
of reason, due to a mental disease, that he did not know the nature
and the quality of the act he was committing. Even if he was aware
of the nature of his act, he may not have known that the act was
wrong. But, if the accused was aware that the act was one which
he should not have committed, and if the act was simultaneously
contrary to established law, he was then subject to punishment.
The House of Lords concluded that the question of whether the
defendant's reason was sufficient to enable him to know that the
act was wrong was for the jury's determination based upon expla-
nations and observations.52 The rationale of M'Naghten and of the
insanity defense itself may be better understood when it is realized
that the purpose of the law is to deter people from committing of-
fenses and to preserve society from the depredations of the danger-
ous and the vicious. It would be futile for the law to attempt to
deter individuals who understand neither what they were doing nor
the premises upon which the law operated from committing crimes
if their mental conditions had deteriorated to the point that they
could not be influenced by either the possibility or the probability
of subsequent punishment. Consequently, in considering the de-
fense of insanity, the jury may be concerned with the state of the
actor's mind only at the time the offense was committed, although
a disordered mind may be inferred from the accused's actions prior
and subsequent to the commission of the offense.5 3 If the defend-
ant's mind was disordered to the requisite degree at the time of
the offense he should be acquitted by reason of insanity.
One of the earliest modifications of the M'Naghten rule was an-
nounced in Durham v. United States.54 Judge Bazelon's erudite
opinion supplemented the right-wrong criteria with the irresistible
impulse standard in an effort to accommodate certain doctrinal ad-
52. The test of criminal responsibility advocated in M'Naghten was
adopted by most common law countries. Cf. King v. Portor, 55 COMMW.
L.R. 182 (High Court of Australia, 1933).
53. See generally, Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE
L.J. 761 (1956); Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CIm.
L. REV. 336 (1955).
54. 214 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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vances in the social sciences. Although the Durham rule has since
been abandoned, 55 many of its underlying premises remain accu-
rate. The Court postulated that because reason is only one element
of man's integrated personality and not the sole determinant of his
conduct, the right-wrong test's emphasis on the cognitive function
was an inadequate guide to criminal responsibility. Relying upon
inadequate, invalid and irrelevant testimony in attempting to define
insanity in terms of a symptom, the M'Naghten court had assumed
an impossible task for which it had no special comptence.
The court rejected the irresistible impulse test 56 which would
have relieved the defendant of culpability if the impulse was uncon-
trollable. Under the new standard the urge to act had to be over-
whelming, so overriding the accused's reason and judgment that
he could no longer choose between right and wrong. But even
though he was impelled to act in accordance with his impulse, the
defendant was still required to remain capable of distinguishing
right from wrong. A verdict of acquittal meant that his mental
state had clouded his reasoning, depriving him of the power to resist
the insane impulse to perpetrate the deed. This test later proved
to be inadequate because it failed to recognize a mental state char-
acterized by brooding and reflection.
The Durham court held that an accused is not criminally respon-
sible if his unlawful act is the "product of mental diease or de-
fect. '57 The problem consisted of determining whether the defend-
ant acted because of a mental disorder or whether he merely dis-
played particular symptoms which do not necessarily accompany
mental disorders. The Court defined insanity as a diseased and de-
ranged condition of the mind which renders a person incapable of
knowing or of understanding the nature and quality of his act, or
of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act. If the
accused is able to know and to understand the nature and quality
of his act and to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the
55. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
57. Id. at 874. For the difficulties involved in this determination,
see: Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist
Views Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87; Schwartz, "Montal
Disease": The Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative Action, 111
U. PA. L. REV. 389 (1963).
commission of the offense, the insanity defense is not available to
him.58
McDonald v. United States,5 9 developed this concept further,
holding that the jury must be instructed that a mental disease or
defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which "substan-
tially affects" mental or emotional processes and which "substan-
tially impairs" behavioral controls.60 The jury was required to
evaluate all expert and lay testimony in arriving at its decision.
The McDonald court also excluded the possibility that specific
disease might constitute insanity per se.
In Blocker v. United States,6' expert psychiatric testimony was
held insufficient to establish a sociopathic personality 2 within the
meaning of "mental disease or defect.603 United States v. Currens6 4
then refused to recognize a psychopathic personality,65 labelling it
a statistical abnormality.66 These two decisions raise doubts as to
soundness of the Court's reasoning processes. Because punishment
is geared to those individuals who are neither a part of, nor capable
of conforming to, societal norms due to a mental disease or defect,
those persons who are incapable of such conformity should not be
subjected to the deterrences society has created.6 7 Although the
accused might outwardly present a "convincing mask of sanity" and
a "minority of human life,"6 he might have lost contact with the
deeper emotional aspects of experience.
Despite judicial hostility toward psychiatric classifications, the
courts have been anxious to admit expert testimony concerning the
defendant's condition. In Washington v. United States9 the Court
held that while expert testimony could not be used to establish the
ultimate fact that the act was the product of the defect, it could
be introduced to explain how the accused's disease or defect related
58. Cf. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
59. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
60. See Acheson, McDonald v. United States: The Durham Rule Re-
defined, 51 GA. L. REv. 580 (1962).
61. 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
62. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
63. See also, Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
64. 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961).
65. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
66. 290 F.2d 751, 762 (3rd Cir. 1961). But see the problems raised in
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), as to status punishment and the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.
67. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181-83 (1968).
68. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 762 (3rd Cir. 1961).
69. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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to his alleged defense. This ruling permitted a demonstration of
how the development, adaptation and functioning of the defendant's
behavioral processes may have influenced his conduct.
Intertwined with the judicial decisions on insanity was the test
formulated by the American Law Institute70 which states that a
person is not responsible for his criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct and as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. This
formulation is broad enough to exclude volitionally and cognitively
impaired non-deterrables from strictly penal sanctions. In this re-
spect it overlaps the M'Naghten standards and the irresistible im-
pulse test, yet it distinguishes between incapacity and indisposition.
Under the ALI formulation, the trier must determine whether,
due to the accused's mental disease or disorder, the threat Of pun-
ishment could not exercise a significant restraining influence upon
him. The defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law and his "non-deterrability" are somewhat interre-
lated and contingent, to a degree, upon his capacity and understand-
ing.
The ALI test was considered quickly and adopted by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Freeman.71 In that case the defendant
was convicted for selling narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173
and 174. Although he denied committing the offense, he contended
that he did not possess sufficient capacity and will to be held re-
sponsible for his acts. Psychiatrists testified that the defendant,
a narcotics addict and confirmed alcoholic for over fourteen years,
suffered from toxic psychosis, delusions, hallucinations, epileptic
convulsions and occasionally amnesia.7 2 The trial court, however,
found that the defendant's condition did not satisfy the rigid re-
quirements of M'Naghten. The appellate court noted that while
the M'Naghten test encompassed cognitive elements of behavior, the
"unrealistically tight shackles . ..place [d] upon expert psychiatric
testimony" 73 deprived the trier of fact of vital information. In ad-
70.. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01 (1962).
71. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
72. Id. at 610.
73. Id. at 619.
dition, the court rejected both the irresistible impulse test as too
narrow and the Durham test because of the definitional difficulties
inherent in its terms. In remanding the case for a new trial under
the ALI formulation, the court elucidated in sufficiently precise
terms the standards under which experts would be recognized as
experts without encroaching upon the function of the trier of fact.
In United States v. Brawner,74 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia abandoned the Durham rule in favor of the ALI
formulation, but retained the McDonald v. United States definition
of mental disease or defect. Chief Judge Bazelon expressed the
hope that the change was not an instance of "the generals ... de-
signing an inspiring new insignia for the standard, [while] the bat-
tle is being lost in the trenches. '7 5
The cohesive element in these decisions, despite their differences
in application, is the belief that an individual must knowingly
choose to act wrongfully before he will be punished for his act.1 0
The criterion of responsibility as affected by mental disease or de-
fect parallels the traditional mens rea rules in requiring a determi-
nation of blame-worthiness; an individual will not become subject
to legal sanctions until he does something which is the product of
a choice.7 7 This is similar to the simple actus reus required for
all criminal acts whether malum in se or malum prohibitum. If
the accused is so affected by a disease or defect of the mind that
he is not responsible for his act, then it is arguable that there was
no act for which the defendant could be convicted.78 Consequently,
for the purposes of criminal responsibility the insane defendant
should not be subject to societal deterrences; 79 punishing such an
individual would be both futile and unjust.80
V. PsYcmATRIc DEFNSES nq TAX FRAUD
Without distinguishing between civil and criminal tax evasion
cases, the courts have treated the defense of mental abnormality
(which negates the willful element required for tax fraud) in an
erratic manner. In an early case, Estate of Gladys Forbes,81 the
74. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Symposium: United States v.
Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 17.
75. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
76. See generally, H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
77. Cf. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968);
Smith, Diminished Responsibility, 1957 C0iM. L. REv. 354.
78. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968).
79. Id.
80. See generally, H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
81. 12 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 176 (1953).
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taxpayer was assessed penalties for substantial underestimation of
her income for the years 1944-1946. The court upheld the taxpay-
er's contentions that she was mentally incompetent in 1946 and that
her failure to file an estimated return was for reasonable cause and
not willful. 82 The court did, however, affirm the Service's assess-
ment for the other years. Estate of Gladys Forbes was rejected
in Pasquale and Mary A. Calabellas8 where the taxpayer under-
stated his income and tax. He contended that his failure to report
was not due to an intent to evade the tax, but was rather attrib-
utable to his mental condition and a defective memory resulting
from repeated electric shock treatment. Psychiatric evidence was
introduced by the prosecution tending to show that because the tax-
payer kept records he could have made the reports despite the fact
that "[E] lectric shock treatment generally results in a temporary
loss of memory and . . . repeated subjection to such treatment
causes a general mental condition .... ,,84 In rejecting this psychi-
atric evidence, the court cloaked its lack of belief in its efficacy
in a failure of proof rationale.
The defendant in United States v. Cain8 5 was convicted of income
tax evasion after having been indicted under section 7201. The trial
court found that although the evidence tended to prove organic im-
pairment and a neurotic personality, it was not sufficiently persua-
sive to negate willfulness. In affirming the conviction, the Court
of Appeals refused to recognize gradations of responsibility for
crime,8 6 stating that:
[I]f a person can distinguish between right and wrong or if he is
aware of what he is doing and has the mental capacity to choose
between a right and a wrong course of action .. the law requires
that he be held responsible for his acts.8 7
But in applying the dogmatic M'Naghten rule, the court did not
acknowledge that while the law may decline to recognize gradations
of crime it does recognize degrees of responsibility and of mens
rea.8 8
82. Id. at 177.
83. 17 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 704 (1958).
84. Id. at 711.
85. 298 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1962).
86. Id. at 936.
87. Id. at 937.
88. Cf. Smith, Diminished Responsibility, 1957 CRiM. L. REV. 354.
The apex of the defense of mental abnormality was reached in
Emmanuel Hollman.89 At his trial for criminal tax fraud the tax-
payer was found to be mentally incompetent and a guardian ad
litem was appointed. In the subsequent civil action for tax evasion
evidence of his severe psychosis was introduced. The court held
that despite the defendant's intricate financial operations,
[I]t must be remembered the fraud must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, and while we are not fully satisfied that the
false returns were a product of mental disease, the psychiatric tes-
timony leaves us with such troubling doubts that we cannot find
that fraud has been proved in this case.90
Reversal would have been probable if the court had decided other-
wise.
In Jacob D. Farber,91 a nebulous Tax Court opinion upheld the
failure to report penalty assessed against the taxpayer. Although
he previously had pled guilty to criminal tax evasion, psychiatric
evidence was proffered concerning the taxpayer's pituitary tumor
and his history of uncontrolled convulsive seizures and endocrine
disturbances caused by the tumor, all of which contributed to his
mental deficiency. However, because the testimonies of the neuro-
psychiatrist, neurosurgeon, endocrinologist and psychiatrist were
unsupported by any contemporareous records or data,92 the court
found the opposite inference persuasive. In finding the evidence
to be "clear and convincing" and without effectively discussing the
issue of willfulness, the court stated that the manner in which the
petitioner failed to report large amounts of taxable income was
strong evidence that he had the intent to evade taxes. The court
did not consider the fact that certain mental abnormalities are often
concretized in ingenious acts directed toward anti-social goals. 93
The Second Circuit apparently recognized the erratic manner in
which the defense of mental abnormality was being handled. In
a tandem of tax evasion cases94 the court affirmatively decided that
their decision in United States v. Freeman,5 adopting the ALI test
for criminal responsibility should operate retroactively. Evidence
of psychotic reactive depression resulting in an inability to consist-
ently distinguish right from wrong was introduced to exculpate the
89. 38 T.C. 251 (1962).
90. Id. at 260.
91. Jacob D. Farber, 43 T.C. 407 (1965), modified by, 44 T.C. 408 (1965).
92. 44 T.C. 408, 410 (1965).
93. Cf. J. KATZ & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY & THE
LAW (1967).
94. United States v. Tarrango, 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Sheller, 369 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966).
95. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
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defendant attorney in United States v. Sheller." In United States
v. Tarrango,97 experts testified that the defendant manifested schiz-
ophrenic reaction, paranoid type, a psychotic condition in which one
loses touch with reality. The court reversed and remanded both
cases on the grounds that fraud requires specific intent and that:
[T]he purpose of the Freeman rule was to deal more humanly and
intelligently with the substantive question whether "certain classes
of wrongdoers are properly the subjects of criminal punishment."98
The Second Circuit continued to develop the application of the
defense of mental abnormality to tax fraud charges in United States
v. Baird. 9 In reversing and remanding defendant's conviction for
failure to file income tax returns under section 7203, the court held
that sincet he defendant's analyst had testified regarding statements
made by the defendant, not during treatment but subsequent to
the occurrence of the offense, the prosecution's expert could testify
similarly. Moreover, the court adopted the position taken by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Whitow,100 wherein the
Court observed that:
There seems to be a tendency elsewhere in insanity cases to allow
the defense psychiatrist to recount the full history obtained from
the defendant regardless of its hearsay or self-serving quality, so
long as the doctor regards it as essential to the formulation of his
opinion. 101
Thus, having molded the general rule of Freeman, the Court then
began to sculpt the details of the rule in typical common-law
fashion.
Other circuit courts have not been as consistent or enlightened
as the Second Circuit. For example, in United States v. Hasel-
tine,10 2 the defendant had been convicted of willfully failing to file
income tax returns under section 7203 even though he had con-
tended that his failure to file was the product of psychological and
emotional pressures rather than for the purpose of avoiding pay-
ment of the tax. Because he did not specifically raise the insanity
96. 369 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966).
97. 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968).
98. Id. at 624; cf. United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969).
100. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
101. 210 A.2d at 771.
102. United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969).
defense, the Ninth Circuit construed his allegations as a tender of
proof of diminished capacity and rejected it as applicable only to
capital crimes.'0 3 The Court affirmed the conviction without con-
sidering the possibility that diminished capacity, not rising to the
level of insanity, might abrogate the element of willfulness required
to support tax fraud charges. Had he convinced the court that his
reduced mental capacity had affected his ability to consciously form
the intent to evade the defendant might have successfully estab-
lished the absence of willfulness.
The Failure of Proof Paradigm
One method that several courts have employed to circumvent the
defense is the failure of proof paradigm coupled with a questionable
application of burden of proof standards. In Fred W. Staudt,10 4
the taxpayer was charged with fraudulently understating his in-
come in 1942 and 1943. During a portion of that period he was
hospitalized with a bladder condition and subsequently spent time
in a sanitarium for a mental condition. The court found him guilty
because he "failed to meet his burden of proof" which required a
showing that his illness had developed to the required extent by
May 15, 1943, and that he was therefore unaware of what he was
doing.10 5 However, the court did not adequately consider the fact
that, because fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence in civil cases, a defendant's mental condition must necessarily
have cast substantial doubt on the element of willfulness.
The technique adopted in Staudt was utilized in Clinton H. Mar-
tin °6 where the taxpayer-doctor understated his professional in-
come in his 1950 return by $7,201.91. He contended that the under-
statement was due to poor judgment caused by the effects of arte-
riosclerosis and that he could not therefore have entertained the
intent to defraud. The court rejected this defense because it was
not alleged that "the doctor was non compos mentis in 1951 or did
not know right from wrong, or was not aware of the significance
103. Id. at 581, relying on United States v. Fahey, 411 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957 (1969). But see United States v. Bishop,
412 U.S. 346 (1973).
104. 12 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 1417 (1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d 610 (4th Cir.
1954).
105. Cf. United States v. Griffin, U.S. Tax Cas. 69-2, at 9611, aff'd, 432
F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968).
106. 18 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 100 (1959), afi'd, 272 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1959);
See also United States v. Mitchell, 432 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910 (1970).
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of his actions."'107 In an aside, the court noted that the defendant's
lack of cleverness did not alter the character of his fraud because
".. . anyone attempting to defraud the United States shows ipso
facto a certain lack of judgment regardless of his mental acute-
ness.' 08 In rigidly applying the M'Naghten test in Martin, the
court appeared to be very result-oriented and stressed the lack of
ingenuity in the taxpayer's actions. A better approach would con-
sider the lack of ingenuity as an indicium of the mental deficiency
of the taxpayer. One who willfully violates tax laws is more likely
to take every precaution to avoid detection and will usually devise
the most ingenious plans possible. On the other hand, a taxpayer
who fails to take precautionary steps in his evasion plan is likely
to be either careless or sufficiently deficient mentally to realize the
nature of his acts. The court in Martin should consequently have
given more than perfunctory consideration to the taxpayer's
claims.
Another failure of proof case was United States v. Benus,10 9
wherein the defendant dentist was found guilty by the court of
willful failure to file income tax returns under section 7203. The
dentist contended that he was incapable of willful conduct and was
therefore insane within the rule of United States v. Currens.110
Since he could not introduce expert evidence that related to other
than the post-indictment period, however, the court thought that
willfulness had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."1 This is
one of the few "failure of proof" cases in which the court appears
to have reached a reasonable result in entertaining a defendant's
attempted psychiatric defense to tax fraud charges.
The taxpayer in Estate of Craddock" 2 was a purchasing agent
for a corporation who received but failed to report kickbacks from
suppliers of the corporation. He was charged with a violation of
section 6653 (b), but contended that his failure to report these mon-
eys was the result of alcoholism. The court, relying on Jacob D.
Farber,"13 discounted the taxpayer's allegations characterizing them
107. 18 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 100, 102-03 (1959).
108. Id. at 103.
109. 196 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1962).
110. 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961).
111. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 460 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1972).
112. 27 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 805 (1968).
113. 43 T.C. 407, modified by, 44 T.C. 408 (1965).
as vague theories supported by equivocal testimony. The court
stated that he failed to prove the defense as the taxpayer did in
Emmanual Hollman1 4 because:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Craddock was always
out of touch with reality or that he rarely, if ever, realized what
he was doing.11
Craddock presents a recurring problem in the courts, especially
in the Tax Court. There appears to be no uniformly applied stand-
ard for determining the amount of proof that must be supplied con-
cerning the accused's mental state to preclude a finding of fraud.
Both "clear and convicing" and "reasonable doubt" standards have
been applied. In addition, the courts are hesitant to indicate ex-
actly what must be proved and by whom it must be proved when
the defense of mental abnormality is raised. Without a consistent
application of uniform rules, at least in the criminal area, there
may be a violation of the "fundamental fairness" required for "or-
dered liberty."1 16
VI. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PSYCHIATRIC DEFENSES
TO TAX FRAUD CHARGES
One of the special considerations inherent in the opinions dis-
cussed above and in the psychiatric defense to tax fraud charges
generally is the unarticulated premise that tax crimes are sui gen-
eris. This powerful silence has deferred the consideration of a tra-
ditional judicial safeguard (the requirement of willfulness) to a
stage in the proceedings subsequent to an independent determina-
tion of guilt. Although the requirement of willful intent has not
been deleted from tax fraud statutes, the courts frequently treat
such offenses as if they were administrative transgressions or pos-
sessory crimes free from the requirement of intent. Perhaps this
sub silentio treatment exists because the courts harbor an intrinsic
belief that tax evasion is a serious public welfare offense which
detrimentally affects all other societal members through increased
taxes. The courts are correct in this assumption, for despite the
fact that tax fraud may appear to be a victimless crime, it has more
profound implications than many other more deviant activities.
114. 38 T.C. 251 (1962).
115. 27 CCH TAX CT. MEsa. 805, 809 (1968).
116. Cf. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 S. CT. REV. 107;
Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An
Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 HOUSTON L. REV.
1039 (1973).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently construed tax
evasion statutes to require (1) willfulness, (2) an affirmative act,
and (3) a bad purpose. Chief Justice Vinson once observed that
"the existence of mens rea is the rule of rather than the exception
to the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."" 7
Mr. Justice Brennan later qualified this statement: "Still, it is
doubtless competent for the States to create strict criminal liabili-
ties by defining criminal offenses without any element of scienter
[but] there is precedent in this Court that this power is not
without limitations. ' " 8 Professor Packer considered these state-
ments to mean that "[m] ens rea is an important requirement, but
it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes." 1 9 The
"sometimes" exception applies when the statute necessitates the ex-
istence of mens rea before the accused may be convicted of its vio-
lation. To convict an individual of an mens rea offense without
valid evidence of the mens rea itself is to deprive him "of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law" in disregard of the
Fifth Amendment. Similarly, to accord recognition to a mens rea-
abrogating defense is to accomplish indirectly what could not be
done directly.
Substantially negating the psychiatric defense in tax fraud cases
is equivalent to punishing conduct without reference to the actor's
state of mind and is therefore inefficacious and unjust. Further-
more, as prosecutions for tax evasion require allegations of mens
rea, ignoring the psychiatric defense may be unconstitutional. Cer-
tainly the in terrorem effect of the tax laws must be maintained
to continue an effective revenue service; but the better method of
narrowing psychiatric defenses in tax fraud cases would be to estab-
lish clearly enunciated standards of uniform application in all crim-
inal tax evasion prosecutions. Under existing statutes, there ap-
pears to be no rational basis for distinguishing between tax crimes
and other crimes. No impairment of the defenses to the require-
ment of a finding of "willfulness" in tax fraud cases should be tol-
erated when similar restrictions would be impermissible in other
contexts.
117. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
118. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
119. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 S. CT. REV. 107.
Strict Liability
One method of effectuating a sounder approach to psychiatric de-
fenses in tax evasion cases would be to remove the necessity of
proving willfulness in civil tax fraud offenses. By restricting those
civil offenses requiring willfulness to per se violations,'1 20 unless
reasonable cause (other than psychiatric defenses) can be shown,'1 21
the in terrorem effect could be retained without threatening rev-
enues or the psychiatric defense in criminal cases. A new standard
that abrogated the intent element in civil tax cases would allow
a defendant to successfully interject the psychiatric defense in a
criminal proceeding and yet remain subject to civil penalties. The
need for the defense in civil cases would be diminished and the
courts could fully develop the criminal defense without fear of al-
lowing exceptions to vitiate the rule.
The abandonment of mens rea as an element of an offense has
been upheld by the Supreme Court on several occasions. 1 22 In
United States v. Balint,12 3 Chief Justice Taft stated:
[T]he emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of
some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes
as in cases of mala in se . . . So, too, in the collection of taxes,
the importance to the public of their collection leads the legislature
to impose on the taxpayer the burden of finding out the facts upon
which his liability to pay depends and meeting it at the peril of
punishment. 124
Professor Wechsler has written that:
Existing law goes further in some areas, prescribing liability with-
out regard to any mental factor, the theory being that the object
of control would be defeated if proof of purpose, knowledge, or
even negligence were required for conviction. The most that can
be said for such provisions is that where the penalty is light, where
knowledge normally obtains and where a major burden of litiga-
tion is envisioned, there may be some practical basis for a stark
limitation of the issue; and large injustice can seldom be done. If
these considerations are persuasive, it seems clear, however, that
they ought not to persuade where any major sanction is in-
volved.125
120. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. RaV. 55, 73, 84(1933); Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV.
1097, 1109 (1952). Contra, Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 403 & n. 70 (1958).
121. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922).
122. Supra note 121; Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 S.
CT. REV. 107.
123. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
124. Id. at 252.
125. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097, 1109 (1952).
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The requirement that unpaid taxes be paid coupled with the impo-
sition of civil penalties would be a light penalty upon conviction
and would not constitute an abuse of an absolute penal liability. 126
It would also tend to minimize the court's apprehension of the psy-
chiatric defense in criminal trials. It must be remembered that a
defendant who successfully establishes a psychiatric defense in a
criminal tax fraud case has surpassed the level of proof required
to vindicate himself in a civil action. Therefore, if the psychiatric
contentions of the accused in a criminal prosecution are irrelevant
in the civil proceeding, it is likely that the courts will increase the
recognition they accord the defense in criminal trials.
Burden of Proof
This approach should also minimize "burden of proof" problems.
Once a sufficient allegation of psychiatric impairment has been
made (regardless of whether the defense has been raised specif-
ically), the government would have the burden of showing beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not suffering from a
psychiatric disability.127 If the evidence, including the presumption
of sanity, does not disprove psychiatric impairment then there must
be an acquittal, providing there was some proof of the mental dis-
ability introduced. It should be noted that the approach taken by
the Supreme Court has not been consistently adhered to in tax
fraud cases.1 28 With the exceptions of the Second Circuit and the
Tax Court in Emmanuel Hollman,129 the courts have tended to shift
this burden to the taxpayer-defendant. 180 In fact, the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Haseltine'31 affirmed a rejection of psychiatric
evidence by the district court where the defendant did not interpose
the defense specifically. This result is clearly incorrect and must
not be permitted to recur.
126. Cf. id.
127. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Dusky v. United States,
295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
128. Supra note 127.
129. 38 T.C. 251 (1962).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1961),
aff'd, 305 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1961); Estate of Craddock, 27 CCH TAX CT.
MEM. 805 (1968).
131. 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969).
VII. PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
Although under the modern view, proof of a psychiatric defense
should come from experts, 13 2 lay testimony is admissible.13 In fact:
[M]any courts in tax cases have permitted lay testimony to become
the make-weight for overcoming what appears to have been quite
substantial expert testimony.134
For example, the court in United States v. Peele'36 ignored the tes-
timony of five psychiatrists and instead adopted the opinions of
three laymen who testified that the defendant was competent de-
spite a prior finding by the court that he was incompetent to stand
trial for criminal tax fraud. However, the better view is to rely
on medically qualified experts.
The testifying expert may not state a conclusion or opinion with-
out telling the jury what investigations, observations, reasoning and
medical theory led to that opinion. He must explain how the de-
velopment and functioning of the defendant's behavioral process
may have influenced his conduct. However, the expert may not
testify as to whether the psychiatric impairment caused the defend-
ant's act, for to do so would be a usurpation of the jury's func-
tion. 3 6 Consequently, a diagnosis of the accused's mental condition
must be limited to a description of how his impairment would tend
to influence his conduct. Yet there appear to be no consistent
standards for determining whether his condition has affected his
conduct in a particular manner.
Expert testimony problems are exacerbated by the question of
whether a particular condition is a mental disease or defect:
Real disputes arise in sanity determinations over the question of
whether a particular diagnosis is or is not a "mental disease" if
the expert witness says it is. But psychiatrists do not agree at all
among themselves as to which of these diagnoses are diseases. Psy-
chiatrists are even less in agreement as to the general definition
of what constitutes mental disease, although many psychiatric the-
132. See Frisone v. United States, 270 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1959); Sympo-
sium: United States v. Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 17; Diamond &
Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations, in PLI, EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF PsYcHIATRIc EVIDENCE 99
(1970); Deiden & Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence and Full Disclosure in
the Criminal Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 534 (1965).
133. Cf. United States v. Peele, 137 F. Supp. 905, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
134. Ritholz, Intent and Psychiatric Disturbances in Tax Fraud Cases,
N.Y.U. 23RD INST. ON FED. TAX. 1339, 1363 (1965).
135. 137 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); see United States v. Benus, 196
F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1961).
136. Cf. Diamond & Louisell, supra note 132, at 103. See discussion in
Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views
Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87.
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orists have opinions on this point. But it sometimes happens in
a trial that the psychiatrists agree on the defendants symptoms and
diagnosis, but they disagree as to whether the diagnosis in question
is a mental illness. Such cases' are not rare, and they would be
far more frequent if every defendant were examined by more than
one psychiatrist. Since most defendants are examined by only one
psychiatrist, this issue is usually resolved invisibly by the luck of
the draw. Now, to have a sanity verdict be determined by the ex-
amining psychiatrist's views on a rather arcane area of abstract
psychiatric theory, rather than by the facts (poorly as they may
be known) of the defendant's psychiatric history, seems ridiculous
to me. And yet the problem appears to have no solution.'8 7
These problems concerning the definitional differences between the
legal and medical concepts of mental disease or defect are widely
recognized and yet remain unsolved.
138
VIII. THE SUCCESSFUL PSYCHIATRIC DEFENSE
The successful assertion of a psychiatric defense in "normal"
criminal situations has profound consequences that should not nec-
essarily be extended to criminal tax evasion cases.'8 9 In the Dis-
trict of Columbia, for example, an acquittal for insanity will usually
result in the commitment of the defendant to a mental institu-
tion.140 The duration of the commitment will vary depending upon
the probability that the accused's release will present a danger to
society or to himself.141 However, these committals can result in
excessive red tape and may eventually necessitate habeas corpus
petitions for release. 142 In other jurisdictions where there is no
commitment requirement the question will probably be delegated
to the state agency responsible for incompetants.
137. Pugh, supra note 136, at 104.
138. Cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); J.
KATz, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW (1967).
139. Naturally, if during administrative procedure, the decision is against
criminal prosecution there is no immediate consequence to the taxpayer be-
cause of his reliance of psychiatric evidence.
140. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-207(2) (1970); see Broderick, Justice in the
Books or Justice in Action: An Institutional Approach to Involuntary Hos-
pitalization for Mental Illness, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 547 (1971); United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
141. Broderick, supra note 140, at 569-89; see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1967).
142. See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Bolton
v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
In Saur v. United States, 148 the Court of Appeals sought to ration-
alize its provincial approach to the psychiatric defense on the basis
of its inability to provide post-acquittal arrangements for the de-
fendant. The court was apparently ready to adopt a more enlight-
ened position but lacked a power comparable to that of the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia to arrange post-acquittal pro-
visions.14 4 If the Saur court had had a post-acquittal power it may
have adopted a more liberal psychiatric defense rule.
The harshness of the automatic commitment rule was ameliorated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v. Herold..45 In that
case a New York procedure whereby the defendant was civilly com-
mitted without jury review of the incompetency determination (a
review available to other persons civily committed) was held to
be violative of equal protection requirements. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia has utilized this approach to cir-
cumvent the mandatory commitment provisions. In Bolton v. Har-
ris,146 the court stated that its prior decisions had found it:
... reasonable to treat those not guilty by reason of insanity dif-
ferently from other mentally ill persons because of the greater like-
lihood that the former will be dangerous to society, and that habeas
corpus provided a sufficient safeguard for their rights .... [How-
ever, under Baxtrom v. Herold] prior criminal conduct cannot be
deemed a sufficient justification for substantial differences in the
procedures and requirements for commitment.' 47
Consequently, because the tax evader is usually not physically dan-
gerous to society, civil commitment should not ordinarily follow the
successful assertion of a psychiatric defense. The defendant should
be able to convince a jury that even though he lacks the mens rea
necessary for tax evasion, it is unlikely that he is dangerous. There-
fore, he should escape criminal penalties and civil commitment and
yet remain subject to civil tax evasion penalties.
Psychiatric Condition As a Mitigating Element
If the defendant is not successful in his assertion of the psychi-
atric defense, a psychiatric condition should nevertheless influence
143. 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
144. Id. at 650:
Many observers implicitly assume in their criticism of the present
law that if the accused is set free on the criminal side that he will
be confined on the civil. Unfortunately, that is not the case. If
it were, this court might be much more disposed to alter its current
views. The choice today in this jurisdiction is not between confine-
ment and commitment, but rather between confinement and free-
dom.
145. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
146. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
147. Id. at 649.
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the post-conviction stages of the case. For example, in United
States v. Cain148 the court weighed the defendant's psychiatric con-
dition on the sentencing issue more heavily than when ruling upon
the substantive issues at trial.149 This approach has been debated
vehemently by scholars but no consensus has yet been reached.1 50
A Particular Danger
Although there has been considerable discussion of the desirabil-
ity of allowing the judge or the prosecution to raise the issue of
insanity, one eminent commission has noted that such a procedure
"... may prejudice the legitimate interests of the defense."'151 The
authors of the Model Penal Code declined to give this authority
even to the judge alone because to do so would threaten "too great
an interference with the conduct of the defense.' 52 In addition,
the defendant's credibility would be impaired should he decide to
testify in his own behalf. However, in Whalemn v. United States'53
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the refusal of the defense to raise the insanity issue did not pre-
clude the court from raising it sua sponte.
Judicial intervention for the purpose of raising the psychiatric
defense in tax fraud cases (and in other criminal cases where the
accused is not obviously dangerous) appears to be an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into the adversary process' 5 4 Moreover, it would
allow the government to introduce the defendant's psychopathic or
sociopathic tendencies (not his mental defects or diseases) to show
that he willfully intended to evade his taxes. Clearly, this proce-
148. 298 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1962).
149. Cf. Insanity as a Defense, A Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369
(1964), where former Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated: "[I]nsanity should have nothing to do with the adjudication
of guilt but rather should bear upon the disposition of the defendant after
conviction. .. ."
150. See generally, Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting
the Degree of a Crime, 59 YALE L.J. 959 (1947).
151. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953, Report 154
(1953).152. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments to 403 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
153. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
154. Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Skolnick, Social Con-
trol in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RES. 52, 60-8 (1967); see supra
note 140.
dure would constitute an impermissible violation of due process of
law and must not be allowed.155
IX. CONCLUSION
Tax fraud, especially that aspect involving the assertion and ap-
plication of the psychiatric defense, is an ambiguous and mutable
area that R. Paul once aptly referred to as "the devious paths of
the spawning tax jungle."'150 An imperfect knowledge of the de-
fense has produced disporate procedures and, ultimately, unequal
applications of substantive laws. A portion of this confusion is at-
tributable to the notions that civil fraud is not evidentiary ripe
enough for criminal prosecution and that criminal fraud is too insid-
ious for merely civil penalties. However, by recognizing and treat-
ing tax crimes as crimes these problems might be alleviated.
155. Supra note 140.
156. R. PAUL, SELECTED READnGs IN FEDERAL TAX LAW (1938); see supra
notes 5 & 11.
